


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GENERALS
J. E. JOHNSTON AND G. T. BEAUREGARD
AT
THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS,
JULY, 1861.
BY
GUSTAVUS W. SMITH,
Formerly Major-General, Confederate States Army.



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
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FORMERLY MAJOR-GENERAL CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY.



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PRELIMINARY.

In the latter part of September, 1861, at the joint request of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, I was appointed Major-General by President Davis, and ordered to report to General Johnston for duty as commander of the Second Corps of his army, then at and in the vicinity of Fairfax Court-house, Va. The First Corps was commanded by General Beauregard. Intimate personal and official relations existed between the three of us.*

After it was decided by President Davis, in the first days of October, that General Johnston's army could not be reinforced to an extent sufficient to justify an immediate campaign of invasion, the forces were withdrawn to the neighborhood of Centreville. During the next few months we had abundant leisure, and, in that time, I became thoroughly acquainted with the principal events connected with the battle of Manassas and familiar with the ground upon which the fighting occurred. The impressions I then received were deep and lasting. They were derived from all available sources, principally from Generals Johnston and Beauregard.

* After the battle of Manassas, the combined forces of Generals Johnston and Beauregard were called the "Army of the Potomac"; which had been the designation of Beauregard's forces before the two bodies of troops were united. Those of the latter were now designated the First Corps, and Johnston's troops, from the Shenandoah, the Second Corps. Up to the time of my arrival General Johnston had commanded this corps, which consisted of eight brigades, not organized into divisions, and he, at the same time, commanded the army. I relieved General Johnston from duty as a Corps Commander, and he was thus enabled to give his undivided attention to the control of the army as a whole.

In 1874 I read General Johnston's "Narrative," and was surprised and *shocked* to find that, in reference to Manassas, his account differed so greatly from the opinions I had formed in 1861, which were derived in great part from himself, and from reading his official report.

In his "Narrative," he not only claimed more credit for his services in that battle than I had been led to believe he was justly entitled to receive, but, in my opinion, he now *unfairly* called in question the accuracy of General Beauregard's official report, and endeavored to detract from the well-earned distinction of that army commander.

In the *Century Magazine*, May, 1885, General Johnston emphasized his attack on the correctness of General Beauregard's official report, and enlarged his own claims.

Since that time the official records have become accessible. I have made a synopsis of those records, and propose to contrast some of General Johnston's more recent statements with his own official report, and with *facts* which were well established in 1861.

GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD

AT THE

BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

PART I.

The Official Records.

Early in the summer of 1861, General J. E. Johnston commanded the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, which protected that valley against the Federal forces under General Patterson; whilst General G. T. Beauregard commanded the Confederate Army of the Potomac, near Manassas, confronting the main Federal Army, which was in the vicinity of Washington City.

These two Confederate leaders controlled separate armies; and, each independently of the other, reported to, and received orders direct from the War Department at Richmond.

On the 11th of June, 1861, General Beauregard, from Manassas, wrote to President Davis: "I wish it distinctly understood, however, that if the army should offer battle on the line of Bull Run, I shall accept it for my command, against whatever odds he may array in my front." Again, on the next day, he wrote: "The enemy seem to be taking the offensive towards Harper's Ferry, and a few days hence may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical condition as to render it impossible to relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon forthwith his present position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine, guarding with small detachments all the passes through which the enemy might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid movement forward, retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria,

if not too strongly fortified and garrisoned, which would have the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from Northern Virginia for the protection of Washington. I beg and entreat that a concerted plan of operations be adopted at once by the Government for its different columns. Otherwise we will be assailed in detail by superior forces and will be cut off or destroyed entirely."

From Winchester, on the 21st of that month, Major W. H. C. Whiting, General Johnston's Chief of Staff, wrote to General Beauregard: "In the event of a move upon you, having now cleared the enemy from this part of the valley, the General might be able to throw from 5,000 to 6,000 men on his flank." Later, on the same day, General Johnston wrote to General Beauregard: "In the absence of a common superior, I am anxious to correspond with you—to be informed of your needs—that I may help you when the state of things in my front will permit me to do so."

On the next day General Beauregard wrote to General Johnston: "I consider the chain of Bull Run Mountain, Little River, and Goose Creek a strong secondary line of defense for my left flank, but should they penetrate into Virginia, this side of it, by moving rapidly a strong force of your command to Aldie or Leesburg to take them in flank or rear, they would have to fall back on the Potomac, or run the risk of being cut off from their base of operations, particularly if I could attack them from here at the same time." Two days later: "I do not believe in the hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede in Washington, thinking that we are going to unite our forces for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Potomac at or about Edward's Ferry to attack it in rear, whilst I attack it in front."

On the 9th of July, General Johnston wrote to General Beauregard: "I wrote you yesterday that intelligence I have just received indicated that the enemy's intention is to advance upon us here. Colonel Stuart, who is at the head of our scouting service, has just written to me, that he suspects, for certain circumstances, that he will move forward to-night. We are just

beginning some little field works, . . . but have done too little to make them available. . . . Militia, about 2,000, were called out, but they have to prepare their own ammunition, which they have not done. So the chances are against us. Less so, however, than a retreat would make them."

The official records show that in the meantime General Beauregard more than once warned the Confederate Government, and General Johnston, that a forward movement of the main Federal Army from the vicinity of Washington was imminent. He urged the importance of transferring General Johnston's army from Winchester to the vicinity of Manassas, and again informed the Government that whether he received aid from General Johnston's forces or not, he had determined to hold the defensive line of Bull Run; and, when the Federals closely approached that position he would assume the offensive, cross that stream, and attack them.

On the 17th of July he telegraphed to the Government, and to General Johnston, that McDowell was advancing with his whole army, and had driven the Confederate outposts from Fairfax Court-house. The War Department at Richmond ordered General Johnston to move his army from Winchester to Manassas. That order was received about 1 A. M. on the 18th, and General Johnston telegraphed to the Government: "I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday. General Patterson seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it, we shall move towards General Beauregard to-day."

On that day (the 18th) the Federals attacked Beauregard's line at Blackburn's Ford. That attack was repulsed, but Beauregard then refrained from making a counter-attack, by crossing Bull Run, because he preferred to await the arrival of Johnston's forces, which he knew had been, on the previous day, ordered to move to Manassas.

On the 19th, a small portion of Johnston's army reached Beauregard. About noon on the 20th, General Johnston himself arrived with another detachment, and he was then confident the whole of his forces would unite with those of Beauregard before daylight next morning.

During the night, by authority of General Johnston, General Beauregard drew up and signed an order for battle, directing the movements of all of Johnston's forces as well as his own.

That order was formally approved, in writing, by General Johnston at 4.20 A. M. on the 21st. It required that :

I.—Ewell's brigade, supported by Holmes' brigade, should commence the offensive movement by crossing Bull Run at Union Mills, and move on the Centreville road to attack the enemy.

II.—Jones' brigade, supported by Early's brigade, was to cross at McLean's Ford, and attack on Ewell's left.

III.—Longstreet's brigade, supported by Jackson's brigade, was to cross at McLean's Ford and go into action on Jones' left.

IV.—Bonham's Brigade, supported by Bartow's brigade, was to cross at Mitchell's Ford, and go into action on Longstreet's left.

V.—Cocke's brigade, supported by Elzey's brigade, was to cross at the Stone Bridge, and the fords on the right thereof, to the left of Bonham's brigade, and move to the attack in the direction of Centreville.

VI.—Bee's brigade, Wilcox's brigade, Stuart's cavalry, and Walton's battery, would constitute the reserve and was to cross at Mitchell's Ford, to be used as circumstances might require.*

At 5.30 A. M. on the 21st, it was reported that the Federals, in large force, were threatening close in front of Stone Bridge. Beauregard's plan, as given above, was at once modified, with the approval of General Johnston, so that the Confederate left would stand on the defensive, and only the right and centre would cross the stream—assume the active offensive—and immediately attack the left flank and rear of the Federals between Bull Run and Centreville. This was Beauregard's second plan.

En route from Winchester to Manassas, General Johnston made an inquiry in regard to the "relative positions" of himself and General Beauregard. In reply President Davis telegraphed him :

* For the full text of this order see Appendix A.

"You are a General in the Confederate Army, possessed of the power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for the success of the object in which you co-operate. The zeal of both assures me of harmonious action."

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON'S OFFICIAL REPORT.*

" . . . I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th. . . . I found General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions. This I did readily from full confidence in his capacity. . . . I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the Army of the Shenandoah during the night as certain, and Patterson's junction with the Grand [Union] Army on the 22d as probable. During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy before such a junction. General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 21st. The early movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected troops prevented its execution. General Beauregard afterwards proposed a modification of the abandoned plan, to attack with our right while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side. . . . About 8 o'clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a commanding hill in rear of General Bonham's left. Near 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the [stone] bridge. General Bee, who had been placed near Colonel Cocke's position, Colonel

* "Official Records," Series I., Vol. II., p. 470.

Hampton, with his legion, and Colonel Jackson, from a point near General Bonham's left, were ordered to hasten to the left flank. . . . The enemy, under cover of a strong demonstration on our right, made a long detour through the woods on his right, crossed Bull Run two miles above our left, and threw himself upon the flank and rear of our position. This movement was fortunately discovered by us in time to check its progress, and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles with the defensive line of Bull Run."

General Johnston then describes, in some detail, the movement of Colonel Evans, supported by General Bee, and later by Colonel Hampton, to check the enemy, advancing on the Sudley road; and the withdrawal of these forces—after a bloody contest—to the plateau where the main fighting occurred later; and on which Colonel Jackson's brigade had just formed in line of battle.

General Johnston adds: "In the meantime I waited with General Beauregard near the centre the full development of the enemy's designs. About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from the enemy's centre towards the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible. Orders were accordingly sent to General Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all speed to the sound of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his regiments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, about four miles off. On the way I directed my chief of artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to follow with his own and Alburdis' batteries. We came not a moment too soon. The long contest against five-fold odds and heavy losses, especially of field officers, had greatly discouraged the troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with them under fire, and some example, had the happiest effect on the spirit of the troops. Order was soon restored and the battle re-established, to which the firmness of Jackson's brigade greatly

contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field. . . .

“My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house. From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position of the enemy beyond the stream and the approaches to the Stone Bridge, a point of special importance. I could also see the advance of our troops far down the valley in the direction of Manassas and observe the progress of the action and the manœuvres of the enemy.”

Speaking of the main fighting on the plateau, General Johnston says : “For nearly three hours they [the Confederate forces] maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him continually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy’s right flank with two companies of his cavalry. . . . The expected reinforcements appeared soon after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the two regiments of General Bonham’s brigade (Cash’s and Kershaw’s) came up, and were directed against the enemy’s right, which he seemed to be strengthening. Fisher’s North Carolina regiment was soon after sent in the same direction. About 3 o’clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey’s brigade. He was instructed to attack the right flank of the enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell, severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, executed it with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was driven back from the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful. He made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again extended his right with a still

wider sweep to turn our left. Just as he reformed to renew the battle Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the field. The enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than the previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw himself directly upon it, supported by Colonel Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery. He executed this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beauregard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of the conflict. He had no more fresh troops to rally on, and a general rout ensued. Instructions were instantly sent to General Bonham to march by the quickest route to the turnpike to intercept the fugitives, and to General Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy's reserve and by night at Centreville. . . . Colonel Stuart pressed the pursuit on the principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies of cavalry, under Colonel Radford and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, which I had held in reserve, were ordered to cross the stream at Ball's Ford to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. . . . A report came to me from the right that a strong body of U. S. troops was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes, who had just reached the field, and General Ewell, on his way to it, were ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, however. . . .

"Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive. . . . The loss of the Army of the Potomac [Beauregard's] was 108 killed, 510 wounded, and 12 missing. That of the Army of the Shenandoah [Johnston's] was 270 killed, 979 wounded, and 18 missing. Total killed, 378; wounded, 1,489; missing, 30. . . . It will be remarked that the three brigadier-generals of the Army of the Shenandoah were all wounded [General Bee, mortally]. . . .

"The apparent firmness of the U. S. troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if

needed, would reach Washington with his army of thirty thousand men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital. It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were in number quite sufficient for their defense. If not, General Patterson's Army would certainly reinforce them soon enough."

From General Johnson's report it *might* be inferred that *General Beauregard waited* until 11 A. M., "the full development of the enemy's designs"; and that, at the end of that time, General Johnston gave specific instructions, telling General Beauregard what to do; and when, and how, to do it. But General Johnston does not *exactly* say this. What he does say will be better understood in view of the specific statements contained in the following:

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

" The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph, on the 17th of July, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine. . . . General Holmes was also directed to push forward. . . . General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operation and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command. . . .

"It became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before daylight, to modify the plan accepted, to suit the contingency of an immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at hand. . . . By half-past four A. M., on the 21st of July, I had prepared and dispatched orders* directing the whole of the Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and regiments of General Johnston which had arrived at that time, to be held in readiness to march at a

* See Appendix A.

moment's notice. . . . Informed at 5.30 A. M., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy had deployed some twelve hundred men with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front [at and above the Stone Bridge, the left of the Confederate line], I at once ordered him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain their position to the last extremity. In my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and centre, on the enemy's flank and rear at Centerville. . . . By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 meridian. These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued. Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, respectively supported by their several appointed reserves. . . . About 8.30 A. M. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters to a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell's Ford, whence we might watch the course of events. . . . In the meantime, about 7 o'clock A. M., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up a position along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cocke's right and Bonham's left, with orders to support either in case of need. . . . So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, some twenty-eight hundred muskets, had also been sent forward to support the position of the Stone Bridge."

In his report, General Beauregard proceeds to describe the Federal movement, by Sudley's Ford, against the Confederate left, and the resistance offered by Evans, Bee and Hampton, before these three commands were forced back to the plateau upon which the main fighting occurred ; and he adds :

"From the point previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left flank ; and we anxiously, but confidently awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centerville, resulting from the pre-

scribed attack in that quarter by our right wing. At half-past ten A. M., however, this expectation was dissipated by a dispatch from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried ; but that in consequence of a communication from General D. R. Jones, he had just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union Mills. But, in my judgment, it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore, it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. . . . These orders having been duly dispatched by staff officers, at 11.30 A. M., General Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action. . . . As soon as General Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied with the organization of the heroic troops whose previous stand, with scarce a parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of history. . . . It was now that General Johnston impressively and gallantly charged to the front, with the colors of the 4th Alabama regiment by his side, all the field officers of the regiment having been previously disabled. . . . As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he, repairing to Portici (the Lewis house), should urge reinforcements forward. At first he was unwilling, but, reminded that one of us must do so, and that properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately complied ; fortunately, because from that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipations of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day."

In his report, General Beauregard describes, in detail, several phases of the main fighting, and adds :

"Now, full 2 o'clock P. M., I gave the order for the right of my line, except my reserves, to advance to recover the plateau.

. . . The Federal lines were broken and swept back at all points from the open ground of the plateau. Rallying soon, however, as they were strongly reinforced by fresh regiments, the Federalists returned, and, by weight of numbers, pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns, and renewed the offensive. By this time, between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock P. M., our reinforcements pushed forward, and, directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as I had ordered forward, to a second effort for the recovery of the plateau, the whole line, including my reserve, which, at this crisis of the battle, I felt called upon to lead in person. . . . The whole open ground was again swept clear of the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robinson houses remained fully in our possession. . . . While the enemy had thus been driven back on our right, entirely across the turnpike, and beyond Young's Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with them, when our reinforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession and took position in that part of the field."

After describing the operations that immediately followed on the left, General Beauregard continues his report: "Another important accession to our forces had also occurred about the same time—3 o'clock P. M. Brigadier-General E. K. Smith, with some seventeen hundred infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's battery, came upon the field, from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had arrived, by railroad, at noon. [They were] directed by a staff officer, sent in person by General Johnston to the left, then so much endangered. . . .

"Colonel Early, who by some mischance did not receive orders until 2 o'clock, which had been sent him at noon, came on the ground immediately after Elzey. . . . [Early's] brigade, by the personal direction of General Johnston, was marched by the Holkham house across the fields to the left entirely around the woods through which Elzey had passed, and, under a severe fire, into a position in line of battle, near Chinn's house, outflanking the enemy's right. . . . Under this combined attack the enemy was soon forced . . . back over Young's Branch and the turnpike into the fields of the Dogan farm, and rearward, in

extreme disorder, across the country in all available directions, towards Bull Run. The rout had now become general and complete. . . . Elzey's brigade . . . pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field that morning. . . .

"The centre brigades, Bonham's and Longstreet's, of the line of Bull Run, if not closely engaged, were, nevertheless, exposed for much of the day to annoying, almost incessant, fire of artillery of long range. . . . They held, virtually paralyzed, all day, two strong brigades of the enemy, with their batteries. . . . Longstreet's brigade, pursuant to orders prescribing his part of the operations of the centre and right wing, was thrown across Bull Run early in the morning, and, under a severe fire of artillery, was skillfully disposed for the assault of the enemy's batteries in that quarter, but was withdrawn subsequently in consequence of the change of plan already mentioned and explained. . . . After the rout, having been ordered by General Johnston in pursuit, in the direction of Centreville, these [two] brigades advanced nearly to that place, when, night and darkness intervening, General Bonham thought it proper to direct his own brigade, and that of General Longstreet, back to Bull Run.

"General D. R. Jones, early in the day, crossing Bull Run with his brigade, pursuant to orders indicating his part in the projected attack by our right wing and centre on the enemy at Centreville, took up a position on the Union Mills and Centreville road, more than a mile in advance of the Run. Ordered back in consequence of the miscarriage of the orders to General Ewell, the retrograde movement was necessarily made under a sharp fire of artillery. At noon this brigade, in obedience to new instructions, was again thrown across Bull Run to make a demonstration. Unsupported by other troops, the advance was gallantly made until within musket-range of the enemy's force, Colonel Davies' brigade, in position near Rocky Run. . . . Not only did the return-fire of the brigade [Jones'] drive to cover the enemy's infantry, but the [knowledge of that] movement unquestionably spread through the enemy's ranks a sense of

insecurity and danger from an attack by that route on their rear at Centreville, which served to augment the extraordinary panic which we know disbanded the entire Federal army for the time. . . .

“General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines of Bull Run at Union Mills Ford—after the miscarriage of my orders for his advance upon Centreville—in the afternoon, was ordered by General Johnston to bring up his brigade into battle, then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as this movement was the brigade, after a severe march, reached the field too late to share the glories, as they had the labors, of the day. As the important position at the Union Mills had been left with but a slender guard, General Ewell was at once ordered to retrace his steps and resume his position, to prevent the possibility of its seizure by any force of the enemy in that quarter. Brigadier-General Holmes, left with his brigade as a support to the same position, in the original plan of battle, had also been called to the left, whither he marched with the utmost speed, but not in time to join actively in the battle. . . .

“It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense of my obligation to General Johnston, for his generous permission to carry out my plans, with such modifications as circumstances had required. From his services on the field—as we entered it together, as already mentioned—and his subsequent watchful management of the reinforcements as they reached the vicinity of the field, our countrymen may draw the most auspicious auguries. . . .

“In the conclusion of this report it is proper, and, doubtless, expected, that I should acquaint my countrymen with some of the sufficient causes that prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised, long since, of all those causes, some of which only are proper to be here communicated. An army which had fought as ours that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. On the fol-

lowing day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospects of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility."

The whole tenor of General Beauregard's official report shows conclusively that he considered himself in active command, by authority of General Johnston, subject, of course, to the orders of the senior in rank on the field whenever the latter chose to exercise the power which that rank gave him.

In addition, the records show that, in an official letter, dated August 16th, 1861, addressed to General T. J. Jackson, General Beauregard said: "I commanded in person on the field on that occasion, being responsible for the success or failure of that battle."

In view of the "record-facts," it is not at all probable that General Johnston is correct, when he says: General Beauregard, "as the younger officer," "claimed" to be "assigned to the command of the left." There is no shade of ambiguity in any portion of General Beauregard's official report; and it is especially clear in contemporaneously asserting that he was in command of the combined Confederate forces.

If Beauregard's statements on this subject were not true, it was General Johnston's duty, at the time, to stamp out such presumption on the part of a junior in rank. General Johnston restricted himself to the terms of his own official report, which—but for Beauregard's official report—would *seem* to show that Johnston had not intrusted the active command to Beauregard.

Whilst a difference of color, in that respect, is plainly discernible in the reports of these two army commanders, nothing is found, in the somewhat guarded expressions used by General Johnston, which, when fairly construed, could well be placed in direct conflict with the specific statements, made by General Beauregard in his official report, in regard to the active command of the combined Confederate forces.

It was, therefore, not to be expected that the latter—a junior in rank—would feel it to be incumbent on him, at the time, to

make special objection to the tone of the report of the former in reference to that question.

Farther quotations from the official records will now be given in illustration of the partial movements made by the Confederate right and centre, under the "second plan" ordered by Beauregard.

In the official report of General D. R. Jones it is stated :

"At 7.10 A. M. [July 21], the following order was received :

"General Ewell has been ordered to take the offensive upon Centreville. You will follow the movement at once by attacking him [the enemy] in your front,' signed 'G. T. Beauregard.'

"I immediately placed my brigade in readiness to advance, and dispatched a messenger to communicate with General Ewell, whose movement I was to follow. Not receiving a prompt reply, I crossed McLean's Ford, and took position with my artillery in battery on the Union Mills road, . . . which the enemy held with a strong force of artillery, infantry, and cavalry. I here awaited the advance of General Ewell for about two hours and a half. . . . The following positive order [was received] through Colonel Chisholm :

"10.30 A. M.—General Jones : On account of the difficulties* in our front it is thought preferable to countermand the advance of the right wing. Resume your former position. G. T. Beauregard.'

"Upon reaching the entrenchments General Ewell sent me an order he had received from General Beauregard, upon which was the following indorsement, viz. :

"The General [Ewell] says this is the only order he has received. It implies he is to receive another. Send this to General Beauregard if you think proper.' Signed, 'Fitz Lee, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.'

"Shortly after this I was requested by General Longstreet to make a demonstration in his favor on my front, followed by an order from General Beauregard, borne by Mr. Terry, 11.30

* The "difficulties" here referred to were caused by the miscarriage of the order to Ewell. The Federals, then pressing on the Confederate left, made it seem injudicious, at that time, for the Confederate right and centre to continue the long-delayed movement against the left and rear of the Federals.

A. M., to advance upon the enemy up Rocky Run, co-operating with General Ewell on my right and General Longstreet on my left. I recrossed the ford, . . . and retraced my route to the position I had occupied in the morning and thence endeavored to communicate with General Ewell. Failing in this, I notified General Longstreet that I was advancing to the assault."

General Jones describes the spirited conflict in which his brigade became hotly engaged for several hours, but with varying success, and adds :

"Although the main object of our attack—the possession of the battery—was not attained, the effect of our operations, I am glad to believe, was none the less important in working out the grand issues of the day. The enemy left, in panic, the strong position from which he completely commanded several fords of Bull Run and the adjacent country for miles around."

There can hardly be a well founded difference of opinion as to what would have been the probable result, if the order to Ewell to attack had been received by the latter, about 7 A. M., and the Confederate right and centre had fallen upon the left flank and the rear of the Federals whilst one-half of McDowell's army was making a wide, detached movement to the north, on a narrow country road, through dense woods, to cross Bull Run at Sudley's Ford, two miles beyond the extreme Confederate left.

Resuming an examination of the official records it is found that a few hours after the battle ended, President Davis addressed the following letter to General Beauregard :

"Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas and on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are appointed to be general in the army of the Confederate States of America, and, with the consent of Congress, will be duly commissioned accordingly."

On the 24th of that month, the Confederate States Secretary of War wrote to General Beauregard :

"Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victory achieved by you."

On the same day, General R. E. Lee, in a letter to General Beauregard said :

"I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. The skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration. You and your troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratulations at their success."

On the next day a congratulatory address was jointly issued to the combined Confederate forces, by Generals Johnston and Beauregard :

"Soldiers of the Confederate States :

"One week ago a countless host of men, organized into an army, with all the appointments which modern art and practical skill could devise, invaded the soil of Virginia. . . .

" . . . We, your generals commanding, are enabled, in the name of our whole country, to thank you for that patriotic courage, that heroic gallantry, that devoted daring, exhibited by you in the actions of the 18th and 21st, by which the hosts of the enemy were scattered, and a signal and glorious victory obtained.

"The two affairs of the 18th and 21st were but the sustained and continued effort of your patriotism against the constantly recurring columns of an enemy fully treble your numbers. . . .

"Comrades, our brothers who have fallen have earned undying renown upon earth. . . .

"Soldiers, we congratulate you on a glorious, triumphant and complete victory, and we thank you for doing your whole duty in the service of your country.

"J. E. JOHNSTON,
General, C. S. Army.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, C. S. Army."

On the 12th of September, 1861, General Johnston wrote to President Davis :

"My rank was expressly recognized by Congress also in the resolutions adopted by that body returning the thanks of Congress to General Johnston, to General Beauregard, and to the

officers and soldiers of the army for the victory at Manassas. . . . My noble associate with me in the battle has his preferment connected with the victory won by our common trials and dangers. His commission bears the date of July 21, 1861, but care seems to have been taken to exclude the idea that I had any part in winning our triumph." *

General Beauregard's official report, as well as that of General Johnston, was made to the Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederate States Army at Richmond. These two reports, *taken together*, must be accepted as the true Confederate history of what occurred at the battle of Manassas, unless they are modified by other official records of the time, or by facts, proved by incontestible testimony, developed later. There are some discrepancies, as already noted, between the respective reports of these two army commanders. But there seems to be no *direct and positive* conflict in their statements when a fair attempt is made to adjust their combined meaning.

The official records in regard to this first great battle of the Secession War, show conclusively that each of the two ranking Confederate officers acquired great and deserved distinction for services in connection with that action. These two commanders were personal friends—they were both gallant and able soldiers—on that field they were close allies—and, in spite of some adverse circumstances, their combined forces gained a signal victory.

But not content with the official records, General Johnston, in 1874, published a "Narrative," in which—without proofs—he claimed more credit than was justly his due—attacked the correctness of General Beauregard's official report, and attempted to depreciate the character of the services rendered by the commander next in rank to himself. He seems to have assumed that his *new version* of these operations must be now accepted as correct, because he was the senior general present. He thus became an aggressor, and forced a close discussion of his later claims.

* Compare the limitations of that letter with the recent wholesale claims and attempt to jostle General Beauregard out of all share, even, except as an executive subordinate.

In an article published in the *Century Magazine*, May, 1885, he repeated, emphasized and enlarged the statements made in his "Narrative."

If his new claims in his own behalf are well founded, the Confederate official records of this battle are woefully misleading, and the concurrent opinion of the Confederate Army, the Government and the people, in attributing to General Beauregard a very large share of credit for the victory gained at Manassas, was based upon a misapprehension of the facts.

In the preface to his 1874 "Narrative," General Johnston says: "I offer these pages as my contribution of materials for the use of the future historian of the War between the States." It is proposed to group some of his more important claims under headings numbered from 1 to 8. Then, at the risk of tedious repetitions of testimony, the statements contained in each of those groups will be compared with the official records made in 1861, including his own official report, and such comments will be added as may seem to be required in order to fairly illustrate his "contributions" and elucidate the truth.

PART II.

General Johnston's (1874-85) Claims Considered.

1. He would now have it believed that "Johnston knew the value of concentration for a fight. He played with Patterson, reinforced Beauregard, and won a victory."*

The official records show that the strategic elements in these Confederate operations—the transfer of forces from the Valley of Virginia to Manassas—emanated from General Beauregard. He notified the Government at Richmond that the advance upon his position by the main Federal Army from Washington was imminent—that he had decided to concentrate his army on the line of Bull Run, and that he would attack the Federals east of that stream when they closely approached his position. At the same time he suggested that the line of Bull Run was the place at which the forces under General Johnston could best be used. But his decision to fight near Bull Run was formed irrespective of any aid he might, or might not, receive from General Johnston.

On the 17th of July he informed the Government and General Johnston that his outposts at Fairfax Court-house had been driven in and McDowell's army was advancing. On the same day the Government ordered General Johnston to move his forces from Winchester to Manassas. That order was received by General Johnston at 1 A. M. on the 18th. He replied: "General Patterson seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it,† we shall move towards General Beauregard to-day."

* Quoted from a notice of "Johnston's Narrative" in the *New York Evening Mail*, April, 1874. See "Battle of Manassas," Beauregard, p. 129.

† In his "Narrative," General Johnston says: "The only question was, whether to attempt to defeat or to elude General Patterson." Whilst Johnston hesitated, General Beauregard's Adjutant-General telegraphed him: "For God's sake come at once." If he had then attempted to defeat Patterson, there would have been no possibility of Johnston's reinforcing Beauregard before the latter had either won or lost the battle of Manassas.

Twelve hours later one brigade started. It arrived at Manassas on the 19th. General Johnston in person, with an additional detachment, reached that place about noon on the 20th. *En route* he received a telegram from President Davis: "You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for the success of the object in which you co-operate."

On the 18th the Federals had moved against Beauregard's line on Bull Run and were checked. Beauregard refrained from then making a counter-attack, because he had reason to suppose he would soon receive aid from Johnston.

In the face of the "record-facts," it is worse than idle to claim, at this late day, that General Johnston is entitled to full credit for the strategy, on the Confederate side, which resulted in the first great battle of the Secession War. There was certainly, on his part, nothing "Napoleonic" in the conception, or in the execution, of the movement he was ordered to make from Winchester to Manassas.

2. He now says that, immediately after his arrival at Manassas, he told General Beauregard the enemy must be attacked as soon as possible next morning; that he (Johnston) sketched a simple order of march which he begged General Beauregard to have prepared and submitted to him for inspection so that the order of march could be distributed to the troops before night; that the papers were not presented to him until after daylight on the 21st; that they differed in great degree from the order sketched the afternoon of the previous day, but as they would "put the troops in motion if distributed, it would be easy then to direct the course of each division." He adds: "The papers" "were not written in the form usual in the United States Army, being written by General Beauregard's Adjutant-General in his name, my sanction to be written on each copy. This was too immaterial to be worth correction, for the troops should then have been in motion."

In contrast with these "After-thoughts" of General Johnston it is well to place here the following extracts from his own official report. In that report he says: "I found General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and

intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's position. . . . During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy. . . . General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock, on the morning of the 21st."

General Beauregard, in his official report, says: "General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command."

In view of the two foregoing quotations, there is no justification for General Johnston's asserting—that :

He told General Beauregard the enemy must be attacked.

He sketched a simple order of march, which he begged General Beauregard to have prepared before night.

He signed a simple order of march about daylight on the 21st, merely that the troops might be put in motion ; because it would then be easy for him to direct the movements of perfectly raw troops over very extended, wooded and difficult country—and fight a battle upon ground with which he was not even acquainted.

"The papers," now in question, were the orders for battle ; see Appendix A. They were not written by General Beauregard's Adjutant-General, and they did not differ from the order of battle "determined" upon "during the evening" of the 20th.*

* "The order" "was written by Major [W. H. C.] Whiting, General Johnston's own confidential staff officer, under General Beauregard's dictation, for the reason that Colonel Jordan, the latter's Adjutant-General, was asleep at the time under [the influence of] a narcotic, which had been administered by Dr. Nott, of Mobile, on account of nervous exhaustion from his almost sleepless labors of nearly two weeks previous.

"When those orders, thus issued, because of the express understanding that General Beauregard should be in command of the field for execution of opera-

3. In reference to the "second plan" General Johnston asserts that: "Three of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's Fords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights before them. This *frustrated the second plan.*" "Perhaps fortunately."

Beauregard's *first* plan—see Appendix A—required that the combined Confederate forces should cross Bull Run early on the morning of the 21st, and attack the Federals. All the accounts, then and later, agree in stating that, at 5.30 A. M. on the 21st, it was reported that large bodies of Federal troops had advanced, on and near the Warrenton turnpike, to the vicinity of Stone Bridge—the Confederate left. On receipt of that information, Beauregard, with the approval of General Johnston, ordered the left to stand on the defensive; and the right and centre to cross Bull Run and attack the left flank and rear of the Federals between that stream and Centreville. This is what is referred to as the "second plan."

On its face, General Johnston's assertion that the attack, which the Confederate right and centre were ordered to make, was "frustrated" by the "reported" appearance of the Federals in their front, is worse than absurd. In reference to that attack it has already been stated he simply says, *in his official report*:

"This, too, became impracticable!" But General Beauregard's official report states that:

"Informed at 5.30 A. M., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy had deployed . . . in his immediate front, I at once ordered

tions, were taken to Colonel Jordan in the morning of the 21st of July, for his official signature, he, a staff officer of long experience, inasmuch as the troops of the Army of the Shenandoah were embraced as well as those of the Army of the Potomac, appended of his *own prompting*, the paragraph of approval for General Johnston, and in person took to him for his signature only such copies as were to be sent to the Army of the Shenandoah, in order, as he stated to him at the moment, to secure beyond the possibility of accident their complete recognition by the Shenandoah troops.

"Not a word or indication of objection as to the form or tenor of the document was made by General Johnston, though the fact that General Beauregard was to exercise the command of all the Confederate forces in that day's operations was thus made a matter of record." See "Battle of Manassas, Beauregard," p. 60.

him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain their position to the last extremity. In my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack with my right wing and centre, on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville. . . . By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory" "by 12 meridian." "These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued. Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet and Bonham, respectively supported by their several appointed reserves. . . . From the point previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left flank; and we anxiously, but confidently, awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed attack in that quarter by our right wing. At half-past ten, however, this expectation was dissipated by a despatch from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried."

In a letter addressed to General Ewell, within a month after the battle, General Beauregard expressed regret that his order for attack "could not be carried into effect, as it would have been a more complete victory with only half the trouble and fighting."

General Johnston approved the "second plan" at the time, and would now have it believed—in face of the official statements made then by General Beauregard—that it was "perhaps," *fortunate* that this plan was "frustrated!"

In this connection the following extracts from "Battle of Manassas, Beauregard," will not be found irrelevant: *

"Upon our part, a determined resistance, nerved by the excellent conduct of our troops in the repulse of the Federals on the 18th, was trusted by General Beauregard to defend the crossing [in front of the Confederate left] sufficiently to allow

* See pages 66 to 70 of that work.

time for our corps of attack [the Confederate right and centre] to make their own offensive movement felt upon the enemy's line, the left of which, wherever found between Bull Run and Centreville, would have been taken in flank and rear. The resistance afterwards maintained by Evans, Bee and Bartow to the entire flanking column fully approved this opinion. But instead of an attempt by the Federal army to cross at and near Stone Bridge, it was divided into two forces, one of which, a column 14,000 strong, was detached in the early morning from the right of the Warrenton turnpike through a narrow, deep-cut road, hedged on both sides by a dense second-growth forest, over a distance of six miles up to Sudley Ford, where it was to cross, and thence march down on our left flank, while the remainder were distributed as follows: Schenck's brigade, in front of the Stone Bridge, and extending about half a mile below it; Sherman's brigade, to the rear and right of Schenck, its left resting on the Warrenton turnpike; Keyes' brigade, still further to the rear on the turnpike; that is, Sherman and Keyes were disposed on the Warrenton turnpike between Stone Bridge and Cub Run; Davies' brigade and Richardson's, united with the command of Davies, were thrown forward in front of Blackburn's Ford, and extending to the vicinity of McLean's Ford, thus isolated at a distance of about three miles from Schenck's, Sherman's and Keyes' brigades, and from Blenker's brigade at Centreville.

"By directing that detached column of 14,000 men through a defile of thick woods to Sudley Ford, the Federal commander had done what nothing but the happiest manœuvres on our part could have accomplished; for he had thus cut his army in two and sent nearly the select half of it for several hours away from the field. . . .

"During the time of this circuitous march of the Federals, our line of battle from Mitchell's Ford to the extreme right at Union Mills Ford, should have been executing the offensive movement General Beauregard had ordered; and the employment of so large a mass of the enemy's forces in the divergent operation by Sudley's Ford had so shortened the Federal line in our front that their left (Richardson's brigade) only covered our line as far as the left of Jones' position at McLean's Ford, so that the

enemy would have been decisively outflanked by Jones, supported by Early, who were on Longstreet's right, not to speak of Ewell, supported by Holmes, who were on the right of Jones and Early. The report of the Federal brigade commander, Richardson, shows his dread of being out-flanked by Jones' force, while the latter held his advanced position and stood awaiting the arrival of Ewell on his right, upon which the general forward movement in full line of battle was to begin.

"In the face of such a movement, which should have begun at 7.30 o'clock at latest (the orders to attack having been sent at 5.30) the Federal left, Richardson, pressed in front by Longstreet and out-flanked by Jones, Early, Ewell and Holmes, must have been instantly routed, exposing still more fatally the flank of Davies' brigade, which must have dissolved in turn; and Blencker's, under the full stress of the flight of these forces and the advance of superior numbers, would have been quickly stampeded. The continuing result would speedily have been that Schenck's, Sherman's and Keyes' forces, demoralized by the unexpected sound of conflict on their rear, and enveloped, must have been overcome and scattered or captured. It is but necessary to read fully the immediate Federal reports and chronicles of the day, or look to the actual rout that occurred under no such pressure either of numbers or position, to see at a glance what must have happened from such a formidable and happily related offensive movement, which even veteran troops could hardly have successfully withstood. . . .

"Yet, when McDowell cuts his own army in two, isolates one part from the other by a defile, it is [by General Johnston] considered 'fortunate' that General Beauregard's plan of attack—by which our forces must have struck in flank the exposed fraction—failed to go into effect; and that the enemy was meanwhile permitted to execute unmolested his own movement, which General Johnston extols as good strategy—the undiverted accomplishment of which was fraught with such danger to us."

It is not deemed necessary, at present, to say anything more in regard to General Johnston's recently expressed opinion that it was, "perhaps," fortunate that Beauregard's order, for Ewell to attack, miscarried.

4. General Johnston says : "I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near eleven o'clock reports that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing on the defensive ; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's great effort was to be against our left. I expressed this to General Beauregard, and the necessity of reinforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, to hasten to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, who was near me, was desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action ; General Beauregard joined me without a word."

From General Beauregard's official report, it has already been very clearly shown what he was waiting for, whilst General Johnston, as above stated by himself, was waiting "for evidence of General McDowell's design." It will presently be seen that it did not require the "felling of trees" by the Federals, in front of the Confederate right and centre, to convince General Beauregard that "the great effort of the enemy was to be against our left."

But General Johnston would have it believed that—*he* told General Beauregard "the necessity for reinforcing the brigades engaged" ; *he* told General Beauregard to order certain specified troops to the left ; *he*, himself, ordered other troops to the same point ; *he* then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, and General Beauregard joined him "without a word."

In short, General Johnston now claims that when it was reported the Federals were felling trees in front of the Confederate right and centre, he (Johnston) suddenly became the sole active director on the Confederate side, and Beauregard became a mere automaton.

The latter, in his official report, states that at 10.30 A. M. he was informed the order for Ewell to attack had miscarried ; and adds :

“In my judgment it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement [of the Confederate right and centre against the left flank and rear of the Federals] which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore, it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. . . . These orders having been duly dispatched by staff officers at 11.30 A. M., General Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action.”

In farther illustration of actual occurrences, on the Confederate right and centre, previous to the time at which these two commanders left Lookout Hill, the following quotations are made from General Beauregard's recently published book, “The Battle of Manassas,” pages 79 to 88.

He says: “Here it may be mentioned as an incident significant in view of General Johnston's present architecture of narrative, that General Beauregard, in order to avoid the open road as they came within reach of the enemy's artillery fire, took the wood paths, and for a moment misled by their intricacy lost his way and rode into a pocket path, followed by General Johnston; but, being familiar with the direction, he struck a straight line through the woods to the point he intended on the Mitchell's Ford road. Halting there for a few moments to send some directions to General Longstreet (he did not go near his position), General Beauregard pointed out to General Johnston the position he intended to occupy a short distance to the left of the road, to which General Johnston thereupon went. And it was thus that he found himself at ‘Lookout Hill,’ in the rear of Mitchell's Ford, where General Beauregard immediately joined him after dispatching a message.

“General Beauregard took that position, however, for no such sedentary purpose as ‘waiting for evidence of General McDowell's design,’ but because it was best adapted for the observation and following up of the attack he had ordered, while af-

fording convenient report of the progress of the enemy's apparent offensive against his left.

"Here from about 8.30 till 10.30, while hearing the firing in the direction of the left near the Stone Bridge, the sound of attack from our own line of battle towards the right was awaited. . . .

"Neither General Johnston nor General Beauregard knew what force of the enemy was in rear of Bull Run, nor what particular forces of our own were in fact immediately opposed to them. They only knew that an attack was in progress against our left flank, which General Beauregard had ordered to hold out to the last extremity, while the forces on our right and centre should be executing the movement for the counter-attack and seizing the enemy's line of communications; and they were waiting in expectation of the sound of this attack, which would have turned the tables on the Federals, giving the Confederates their ammunition and subsistence trains, and effectually cutting off their retreat.

"But General Johnston's account is constructed so as to assert that our plan of attack, having been frustrated before eight o'clock by the report from chosen scouts of strong bodies of troops in front of our right, the forces were standing without active orders from that hour up to eleven, while he was waiting for evidence of the enemy's design, etc.

"Now, the actual course of events at headquarters, after Generals Johnston and Beauregard took position in rear of Mitchell's Ford, was as follows: General Beauregard had sent the signal officer (Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander, an accomplished officer of his army) to Wilcoxon's Hill with couriers to observe and report to him. Captain Alexander sent General Beauregard two dispatches (*written*, as were all his dispatches to headquarters in the field, not *signaled*), importing that forces of the enemy were crossing the Run at different points. Later he came to General Beauregard in person, and pointed out a column of dust, which by this time had risen so high as to be visible above the trees from our position. General Beauregard thereupon dispatched Captain W. H. Stevens, of the Engineers, to the extreme left, provided with couriers and

with orders to send him a report of the condition of affairs every ten minutes.

“Meanwhile, and before any such report came from the left (General Johnston being immediately present and a witness of ear and sight), General Beauregard received from General Jones, by Captain Terry, of Texas, a dispatch stating that he had been in position all along waiting for General Ewell’s force to come up on his right and begin the offensive movement, as ordered, upon Centreville, but that Ewell had not come into position. General Beauregard immediately despatched Captain Terry to Ewell with an order to hasten forward. Soon, however, the firing on the left increased sensibly, and General Johnston said that, as matters seemed to be growing serious in that quarter, he thought he had better go there. He proposed nothing more than this, the usefulness of his immediate personal presence with the troops engaged, while General Beauregard remained in rear of Mitchell’s Ford directing our own offensive movement which he had just reurged upon Ewell. General Beauregard thought it a very useful thing for General Johnston to do, but in a few moments, and before the latter started, a dispatch came to General Beauregard from General Ewell himself, showing that he was not merely delayed on the way, but that, not having received the final order to move to the attack, he had been at a stand in his original position awaiting it.

“This news altered the whole aspect of the question to General Beauregard, who, from his knowledge of the country to be covered, thought it now unlikely that the troops would be able to get into position in time to make their attack felt on the right so as to co operate decisively with the defensive action by such troops as were then on the left, and, expressing this consideration to General Johnston, said that the attack which had just then been reurged by order to General Ewell (to move into position with the advanced line that was waiting for him), should be abandoned altogether, and that all available reinforcements should be hastened to the left so as to fight the battle in that quarter. General Johnston, stating that he could give no positive advice on the subject on account of his not understanding the country and knowing but little of the location of the troops, expressed his

agreement with General Beauregard's opinion, though giving his for what it was worth. . . .

"General Beauregard thereupon ordered General Bonham, who was at hand, to send to the left two regiments and a battery (Kershaw's and Cash's regiments with Kemper's battery were sent), and dispatched orders to Holmes and Early to move to the same quarter, and to Jones and Ewell to resume their former position. But, considering it also necessary to maintain a strong demonstration along our position in front of the Run, so as to detain the enemy there, he gave, before setting out for the left, directions to this effect to Bonham, Longstreet, Jones and Ewell. After he had dispatched these orders, General Johnston and he set out together for the scene of the engagement.

"In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard relates this change of tactics as made with General Johnston's 'sanction,' studiously maintaining here, as elsewhere, that reserve and deference which military men will understand as due from the junior to the senior officer present, and toning statements down to the least self-expression consistent with the facts. . . .

"General Johnston in his official report had here said :

"'About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from the enemy's centre towards the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible.'

"The language of this passage was noticed by General Beauregard at the time as, though being literally true so far as it gave General Johnston's opinion as expressed in concurrence with that of General Beauregard as above related, yet bearing an incorrect suggestion. But he [Beauregard] was very grateful for the coming of the Shenandoah force to his assistance, and his feelings were averse to the least thing that might raise a coldness between him and General Johnston. The facts had been so clearly stated in his report, which, though he was the junior, was not questioned by his senior, whose duty it was to do so immediately after reading it [if it needed correction], and, moreover, the

substantial facts themselves were so notorious that it might have seemed a pruriency to have raised under such conditions any contentious question."

The "incorrect suggestion," contained in the quotation just given from General Johnston's *official report*, is the germ from which has now been developed his claim that he told General Beauregard to order certain troops to reinforce those engaged—himself at once ordered additional forces to the same point—then set off for the scene of action, and was joined by Beauregard "without a word!"

Further comment on this branch of the subject is not needed here.

5. In his "After-thoughts" General Johnston states, very truly, that, "A large proportion of" General Beauregard's own army "was not engaged in the battle," and adds:

"This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed in the interval on Bonham's left—if not then, certainly at nine o'clock, when a Federal column was seen turning our left; and, when it seemed certain that General McDowell's great effort was to be made there, Bonham's, Longstreet's, Jones's and Ewell's brigades, leaving a few regiments and their cavalry to impose on Miles' division, should have been hurried to the left to join in the battle."

In General Beauregard's first order for battle—see Appendix A—Jackson's brigade was assigned to the support of Longstreet's brigade, Bee's brigade was assigned to the reserve; Elzey's brigade was to support Cocke, in the vicinity of Stone Bridge, and Bartow's brigade was to support Bonham at Mitchell's Ford. But, when it was reported, on the morning of the 21st, that the Federals were threatening in front of Stone Bridge, Elzey's brigade and a large portion of Bartow's had not arrived at Manassas Junction. Thus, the Confederate left was deprived of its regularly assigned supports, and the Federals were unexpectedly moving in force against that part of the line. The non-arrival of Elzey's and Bartow's troops made it necessary to transfer Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left, before 7 A. M.

At that time General Beauregard, with the approval of General Johnston, had just ordered an important forward movement to be made by the right and centre of the Confederate forces. It is, therefore, worse than absurd for General Johnston to assert that it was "a great fault" on his part, that he did not order Holmes and Early to the left when Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of Stone Bridge.

General Johnston further says: "We could distinctly hear [about 10 A. M.] the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile force that Evan's troops and those of Bee, Hampton and Jackson, which we could see hurrying towards the conflict in that order were not adequate to resist."

There was a ridge of high ground and much woods between the hill on which General Johnston was then stationed and the low ground upon which the fighting was going on, four or five miles from him. It was physically impossible for him to have seen "Evan's troops and those of Bee, Hampton and Jackson" "hurrying to the conflict in that order."

But, if he had then seen what he says he did; and those troops were "adequate to resist" the "hostile force" in their front; it would seem that General Johnston had no good reason to censure himself for not having ordered "Holmes and Early" to move to the left, before 7 A. M., when they were needed on the right to carry into effect the order for the Confederate right and centre to attack the left flank and rear of the Federals.

It is difficult to perceive why he censures himself in this matter except for the double purpose of having it now believed that he was in active executive command during all these operations, and of throwing discredit on Beauregard's order for the Confederate right and centre to attack the left flank and rear of the Federals.

6. After stating that General Beauregard "joined" him "without a word"! General Johnston adds: "While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented."

General Beauregard, in his official report, says: "As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he, repairing to" "the Lewis house, should urge reinforcements forward. At first he was unwilling, but, reminded that one of us must do so, and that properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately complied; fortunately, because from that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipation of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day."

General Johnston, in his official report, says: "Order was soon restored and the battle re-established. . . . Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field."

Whatever discrepancies there may be in the above extracts from the official reports, there is none in regard to the time and place at which the incident in question occurred. Each of those reports shows that General Johnston is certainly in error when he says: "While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign him." The suggestions were made after the Confederates had been rallied on the plateau, and "the battle re-established."

There was no occasion, at any time, during these operations, for General Beauregard to urge—suggest—or request—that he be *assigned* to the command of "those troops"—because he was already, by authority of General Johnston, in actual command of all the forces of both of the Confederate armies on that field. But he did insist that General Johnston should leave the fighting line, and repair to the Lewis house for the purpose of urging reinforcements forward. In this, General Beauregard, in good faith, was taking the best measures to achieve success, under the authority generously conferred upon him by General Johnston, when he approved Beauregard's plans and directed their execution under Beauregard's "command." It is true that Johnston was reluctant to leave the plateau, but there was no longer a pressing necessity for the personal presence of both of these commanders in the fighting line, and General

Johnston acted wisely in accepting Beauregard's urgent advice in this matter.

7. In his "After-thoughts," General Johnston says: "Learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the left, which he did." "As fought, the battle was made by me; Bee's and Jackson's brigades were transferred to the left by me, I decided that the battle was to be there, and directed the measures necessary to maintain it; a most important one being the assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this left, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would have commanded there if the Federal left had attacked." "He [Beauregard] commanded those troops under me; as elsewhere Lieutenant-Generals commanded corps and Major-Generals divisions, under me." "We were compelled to fight on the defensive . . . on a new and unsurveyed field" "selected by General Bee."

In General Johnston's official report there is no intimation of the implied censure contained in his statement that he had to, *again*, desire General Beauregard to transfer Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left. The necessity for that transfer of these two brigades was caused by General Johnston's mistake in regard to the time of arrival of a large portion of his own army.

In his official report he says that on the afternoon of the 20th he "regarded the arrival of the remainder of the army of the Shenandoah during the night as certain." On this assurance from General Johnston, General Beauregard, as already stated, assigned Bee's brigade to the reserve, Jackson's brigade to support Longstreet, Elzey's brigade to support Cocke, and Bartow's brigade to support Bonham. It has already been shown too, that, when it was reported at 5. 30 A. M., on the 21st, that the Federals, in strong force, were threatening the Confederate left, Elzey's brigade, and a large portion of Bartow's had not arrived at Manassas Junction; and the brigades of Cocke and Bonham were thus deprived of the supports which had been assigned to them. In this state of affairs it became necessary to transfer Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left.

General Beauregard, in his official report, says:

"About 7 o'clock A. M., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up position along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cocke's right and Bonham's left, with orders to support either in case of need. . . . So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, some twenty-eight hundred muskets, had also been sent forward to support the position of the Stone Bridge."

But, even if it were true that, very early on the morning of the 21st, General Johnston had, *again*, to desire General Beauregard to transfer Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left, this would not prove that the battle, "as fought," was made by General Johnston. At the time of the transfer of these two brigades, Beauregard had just ordered the Confederate right and centre to attack the Federal left flank and rear, and ordered the Confederate left "to maintain their position to the last extremity"; and General Johnston approved those orders.

In asserting that *he* "decided that the battle was to be" "on the Confederate left," General Johnston ignores his own statement that, "We were compelled to fight on the defensive, . . . on a new and unsurveyed field" "selected by General Bee."

"The field" *was* "unsurveyed," and unknown, to General Johnston; but General Beauregard was thoroughly acquainted with all the ground upon which these operations were conducted. He certainly had *something to say* in regard to "the measures necessary to maintain it"; and it must be admitted that General McDowell *decided* the question as to where the battle was to be fought.

It is not necessary to repeat here the circumstances connected with the so-called "assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this left, which he held." But, in reference to General Johnston's assertion that General Beauregard "commanded those troops under me, as elsewhere, Lieutenant-Generals commanded corps, and Major-Generals divisions under me"; it may well be said that this is not in accord with the official records of these events—including the letter of the President of the Confederate States, written at Manassas a few hours after the

battle ended—the letters of the Secretary of War and General R. E. Lee, dated a few days later—the joint congratulatory address issued by Generals Johnston and Beauregard four days after the fight—and the resolutions adopted by the Confederate Congress, returning the thanks of that body to Generals Johnston and Beauregard for the victory.

8. It will be borne in mind that, in General Johnston's official report, the only reference he makes to the failure of the Confederate right and centre to attack the left flank and rear of the Federals is contained in the words: "This, too, became impracticable." In that report he makes no mention of the miscarriage of the order for General Ewell to move into action very early on the morning of the 21st.

General Johnston now asserts:

"There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville." "But he had no reason to suppose that his commander [Beauregard] desired him to move to Centreville where there was then no enemy." "General Ewell was not 'instructed in the plan of attack,' for he says in his official report: 'I first received orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I next received a copy of an order sent to me by General Jones, in which it was stated that I had been ordered to his support.' Three other contradictory orders, he says, followed."

"General Ewell does not say that 'three other contradictory orders, were received by him, as General Johnston ventures to assert, manifestly with the object of fathering upon that worthy officer an official criticism of General Beauregard's orders, of which he was incapable.'"*

"General Beauregard's were successive orders, and no more contradictory than are any two or more successive orders to suit the changing circumstances of a battle. They were issued by him with General Johnston present—they controlled the actions of the divisions of the army in the crisis of the day."†

It has already been shown that General Ewell received the first order issued by General Beauregard early on the morning of

* "Battle of Manassas."—Beauregard, p. 107.

† Page 108.

the 21st, which required all the Confederate forces to be prepared to make an immediate "offensive movement" in the direction of Centreville. General Ewell's Adjutant-General, in a note written on the field that morning, stated that the above order was received by General Ewell, and adds: "It implies he is to receive another."

There is no justification for General Johnston's late assertion that General Ewell "had no reason to suppose that" General Beauregard "desired him to move to Centreville where there was no enemy." In point of fact, Blenker's brigade, over 3,000 strong, was at Centreville, and Davies and Richardson, 6,000 strong, were in advance of that place not far from the Union Mills road, on which Ewell was to have moved, and initiated the attack against the left flank and rear of the Federals.

It is not necessary to repeat here what has already been said in regard to the effect that would probably have been produced upon the brigades of Richardson, Davies and Blenker, then upon those of Keyes, Sherman and Schenck, and finally upon the remainder of McDowell's army, if the Confederate right and centre had advanced, about 7 A. M., and promptly attacked the Federal left and rear, as they surely would have done but for the miscarriage of the order sent to General Ewell, about 5.30 A. M.

In conclusion it may be stated that distinct traces of General Johnston's method of conveying wrong impressions—by omissions and special wording—are found in his official report. These peculiarities—and worse—are far more pronounced in his "Narrative," and they reach their full development in his *Century Magazine* article.

It has not been considered necessary to point out, in detail, *all* the instances in which he has resorted to such devices for the purpose of conveying "incorrect suggestions" in regard to his own and General Beauregard's connection with these operations; neither has it been deemed essential to dwell upon *all* the wrong conclusions that might be drawn from the statements he has thus "contributed" to history. It is believed that enough has been said to give a clear idea of the character of his attempts to unduly exalt his own credit, and unfairly detract from the well-earned distinction of General Beauregard.

APPENDIX A.

“HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
“July 20, 1861. }

“SPECIAL ORDERS, }
“No. ——. }

“The following order is published for the information of division and brigade commanders:

“I. Brigadier-General Ewell’s brigade, supported by General Holmes’ brigade, will march *via* Union Mills Ford and place itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville or to move in the direction of Sangster’s Cross-roads, according to circumstances.

“The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

“II. Brigadier-General Jones’ brigade, supported by Colonel Early’s brigade, will march *via* McLean’s Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court-house, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell’s command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

“The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

“III. Brigadier-General Longstreet’s brigade, supported by Brigadier-General Jackson’s brigade, will march *via* McLean’s Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court-house, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Jones’ command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

"IV. Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by Colonel Bartow's brigade, will march *via* Mitchell's Ford to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Third Division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

"The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

"V. Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey's brigade, will march *via* Stone Bridge and the fords on the right thereof to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Fourth Division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

"The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-Chief.

"VI. Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, supported by Colonel Wilcox's brigade, Colonel Stewart's regiment of cavalry and the whole of Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will march *via* Mitchell's Ford, to be used according to circumstances.

"VII. The light batteries will be distributed as follows :

"1. To Brigadier-General Ewell's command, Captain Walker's six pieces.

"2. To Brigadier-General Jones', Captain Alburtis' and Standard's batteries, eight pieces.

"3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet's, Colonel Pendleton's and Captain Imboden's batteries, eight pieces.

"4. To Brigadier-General Bonham's, Captain Kemper's and Shield's batteries, eight pieces.

"5. To Colonel Cocke's, Colonel Hunton's and Captains Latham's and Beckham's batteries, twelve pieces.

"VIII. Colonel Radford, commanding cavalry, will detail, to report immediately, as follows :

"To Brigadier-General-Ewell, two companies of cavalry.

"To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies of cavalry.

"To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies of cavalry.

"To Brigadier-General Bonham, three companies of cavalry.

"To Colonel Cocke, the remaining companies of cavalry, except those in special service.

"IX. The Fourth and Fifth Divisions, after the fall of Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court-house, *via* the Braddock and turnpike roads, to the north of the latter.

"The First, Second and Third Divisions will, if necessary, support the Fourth and Fifth Divisions.

"X. In this movement the First, Second and Third Divisions will form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, that of the second in command. The reserves will move upon the plains between Mitchell's Ford and Stone Bridge, and, together with the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, will be under the immediate direction of General Beauregard.

"By command of General Beauregard.

"THOMAS JORDAN,
Assistant Adjutant General."

"HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
July 21, 1861, 4.30 A. M. }

"SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. —. }

"The plan of attack given by Brigadier-General Beauregard in the above order is approved and will be executed accordingly.

"J. E. JOHNSTON,
General, C. S. Army."



FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGIN



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